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Abstract 
 
Robert Triffin (1911-1993) played an important role in the international monetary debates in the 
postwar period. He was known as one of the main advocates of a multipolar international monetary 
system. In this paper we analyse the origins of Triffin’s “regional” approach towards international 
monetary integration. We argue that Triffin’s experience with the European Payments Union (EPU) 
played hereby a crucial role. Triffin was not only an “architect” of the EPU, but the EPU also led to 
an important shift in Triffin’s view of the geography of the international monetary system. Before his 
work on the EPU, Triffin thought of the international economy as composed of two geographical 
entities: national economies and the world economy. With his work on the EPU he introduced a 
third geographical entity: the region. The EPU would so be at the basis of Triffin’s advocacy of a 
regional approach towards international monetary integration. Moreover, while Triffin was initially 
quite positive on the IMF, he became, through his EPU experience, more critical of the IMF and its 
worldwide approach. 
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I am very much in sympathy with the empirical and pragmatic approach to our problem, as 
long as it is allied to bold and imaginative thinking and does not reflect merely inertia and 
cowardice" (Triffin, as quoted in Knorr 1952c: 45). 
 
1. Introduction 
Robert Triffin (1911-1993) played an important role in the international monetary debates 
in the postwar period. He became famous with his book Gold and the Dollar Crisis, 
published in 1960, in which he predicted the end of the Bretton Woods system. But he 
was already influential before that. Eichengreen (1993, ix) even describes him as "the 
EPU’s architect". In this paper, we focus not only on Triffin's role in the creation of the 
EPU, but also on his vision that a regional approach was the most appropriate way to 
reform the international monetary system. We argue that the experience of the EPU was 
at the origins of Triffin 's advocacy of a multipolar international monetary system. 
 
As argued by one of us (Maes 2013), there was a remarkable continuity in Triffin’s vision 
of the international monetary system. From his earliest writings, Triffin argued that the 
international adjustment process was not functioning according to the classical 
mechanisms. As countries needed time for economic adjustment, Triffin argued that 
international liquidity should be at the core of the international monetary system, and he 
pleaded for better economic policy coordination as well.  
 
In this paper we argue that the European Payments Union led to an important shift in 
Triffin’s view of the geography of the international monetary system. Before his work on 
the EPU, Triffin thought of the international economy as composed of two geographical 
entities: national economies and the world economy. With his work on the EPU he 
introduced a third geographical entity: the region. The EPU would so be at the basis of 
Triffin’s advocacy of a regional approach towards international monetary integration. 
 
Triffin was one of the architects of the European Payments Union, which was created in 
1950. At the centre of the EPU was the "clearing house" which not only played a role in 
the clearing and settlement of payments but also in the provision of (temporary) financing 
of balance of payments deficits and the coordination of economic policies, key elements of 
Triffin’s approach. Moreover, Triffin defended the use of a new unit of account to express 
the clearing balances. The EPU became a big success, for which Triffin also claimed 
credit.  
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After the EPU, Triffin put forward proposals for reforming the international monetary 
system. But because he doubted that they would come to fruition, he also developed 
plans for regional monetary integration, at the beginning, particularly for Europe and later, 
throughout the 1960s, also for other geographical areas. They were very much based on 
his experience with the EPU, as they focused on a (European) Reserve Fund and 
(European) currency unit. In Triffin’s view, the regional and worldwide approaches were 
complementary, aiming at a new multipolar international monetary system, with the 
European Community as an essential pillar. He thus became a great partisan of European 
monetary integration. As he observed in Europe and the Money Muddle, "Countries whose 
peace, progress and welfare are intimately interdependent must, in their own interest, 
learn to use or limit their national sovereignty in the light of their interdependence" (Triffin 
1957: 30).  
 
As observed by former IMF Managing Director Jacques de Larosière, "The most 
remarkable thing about the work and personality of Professor Robert Triffin, in my view, is 
the combination of three aspects: his power of analysis, his institutional imagination, and 
his pragmatism as a practitioner." (de Larosière, 1991, p.135). All this comes clearly to the 
fore in Triffin’s contributions to the creation of the EPU and his regional approach toward 
international monetary integration. 
 
In this paper, we first go into Triffin’s formative years and the economic situation in Europe 
after the war. Thereafter, the paper focuses on Triffin’s analysis of the postwar situation, 
his contributions to the creation and functioning of the EPU and his defense of the EPU 
against criticism. We further pay attention to his relation with the IMF. The last section 
shows how the EPU shaped Triffin’s later approach towards international and European 
monetary integration. 
2. Triffin's formative years 
2.1 Undergraduate studies in Louvain and the Belgian franc devaluation of 1935 
Robert Triffin was born in Flobecq (Belgium). He studied at the University of Louvain, 
obtaining a degree in Economics in 1935. As a young economist, he was active at the 
Institut des Sciences Économiques (ISE) (Triffin, 1987: 33). The dominant figure was 
Léon-H. Dupriez, a leading scholar in business cycle analysis (Maes 2010). Triffin was 
one of Dupriez's pupils and he also collaborated with other two members of the ISE, Paul 
van Zeeland, who was specialised in monetary economics (Lettre de remerciements to 
P. van Zeeland, 09/08/1934, RTA), and Ferdinand Baudhuin, an economic historian (Lettre 
d'acceptation de Triffin comme assistant, 06/08/1934, RTA). 
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Belgium, as a small open economy, was badly hit by the Great Depression. In March 
1935, Paul van Zeeland, was appointed Prime Minister. He immediately devalued the 
franc by 28 %. The young Robert Triffin made the calculations for the devaluation 
percentage.  
 
In 1935, Triffin wrote a statistical article explaining the calculation and interpretation of 
differential group indices of prices, which had formed the basis for the devaluation 
percentage. Triffin argued that the differential movement of prices, especially the rigidity of 
domestic costs, was leading to serious losses in Belgian manufacturing, causing also the 
closure of firms: "The seemingly favourable sales prices constituted starvation prices for 
our industrialists, leaving half the country's enterprises trading at a loss in 1934" (Triffin 
1935: 290).  
 
Triffin further concluded that agricultural prices were much more sensitive to the business 
cycle (Maes 2013). This would become an important theme in his later work, which 
pointed out that deflationary policies at the centre of the economic system would have an 
even greater impact in the periphery of the world economy.  
 
In 1937, when he was a Ph.D. student at Harvard University, Triffin published a new article 
on the Belgian franc devaluation. He started with a trenchant critique of Cassel's 
purchasing power parity theory, especially for not being suited to situations of 
disequilibrium (Triffin 1937). Triffin's fundamental criticism, in line with his earlier article, 
was that Cassel did not look at the structure of prices in a country. Like Dupriez, Triffin 
made a distinction between "sheltered" and "non-sheltered" sectors of the economy. In the 
non-sheltered sector of the economy, sales prices had to be aligned on world market 
prices. However, costs in the non-sheltered sectors were largely determined by domestic 
factors, leading to a profit squeeze, a decline in production and rising unemployment. 
2.2 Schumpeter and the spell of pure theory 
Robert Triffin went to Harvard in 1935 for his Ph.D. in Economics. There, he fell under the 
spell of Joseph Schumpeter and pure economic theory. At the centre of economic theory, 
for Schumpeter, was general equilibrium theory. Triffin wrote a dissertation on General 
Equilibrium Theory and Monopolistic Competition (Triffin 1941), under the direction of 
Schumpeter, along with Leontief and Chamberlin. In this work, he tried to reconcile 
imperfect competition theory, which had its origins mainly in Marshallian partial equilibrium 
theory, with general equilibrium theory. So, Triffin became an authority on imperfect 
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competition theory (Backhouse, 1985: 139). While he would not pursue these theories, 
they would shape his perception of international monetary phenomena. 
2.3 The Federal Reserve and the Latin America missions 
From August 1942 to July 19461, Triffin worked for the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System in Washington, focusing on Latin America. Initially, he worked at the 
Research and Statistics Division, compiling statistics on money and banking for Latin 
American countries as well as analyses of their central bank operations and monetary and 
banking legislation. He was more and more absorbed by what one might characterise as a 
"progressive Keynesian" spirit. The Triffin missions to Latin America constituted a break 
with the earlier approaches to "international money doctoring". Triffin himself emphasized 
that his aim was to put monetary and banking policy at the service of the "overwhelming 
development objectives previously ignored in central bank legislation copied one from the 
other and trying merely to imitate a distant and largely inappropriate Bank of England or 
U.S. Federal Reserve model" (Triffin 1981). 
 
For Triffin, the economic cycle in Latin American economies was not so much determined 
by domestic savings and investment, like in the older industrial countries, as by the inflow 
or outflow of foreign exchange. The limited control of central banks over the money supply 
aggravated the basic vulnerability of these economies to international disturbances, thus 
affecting economic growth. 
 
Triffin was further critical of exchange rate adjustments as an economic policy instrument 
in these countries. He questioned the efficacy of a devaluation to bring about a balance of 
payments readjustment, as these were highly specialised countries, with few export 
products, facing inelastic demand. Triffin's analysis was clearly shaped by his background 
in imperfect competition theory, "The situation recalls the case of oligopolistic competition 
in which none of the sellers are usually able to profit for very long from price-undercutting 
policies" (Triffin 1944a: 112). 
 
Although the precise details of Triffin's reform proposals might differ, two main aspects 
were remarkably constant over time and from country to country2. The first is an active 
role of the central bank in pursuing anti-cyclical monetary policy, with a priority on 
financing rather than adjustment of balance of payments disequilibria. Central banks were 
provided with broad and flexible techniques of monetary control on both the domestic 
                                                
1 Leonard R.F., Lettre au sujet de la démission de Triffin, 26/07/1946, RTA. 
2 See also the report drafted by Triffin for the reform of the monetary and banking legislation of Paraguay 
(Triffin, 1944b: 25-77). 
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credit system and monetary reserves. He also suggested that central banks should resort 
to non-discriminatory exchange controls instead of a devaluation or deflationary policies 
when a country experienced a temporary reserve shortage. The second aspect is finance 
for development, especially with the creation of official and semi-official credit institutions 
for the promotion of agricultural and industrial development. The central bank should also 
support their activity.  
 
3. Triffin's first analysis of the international monetary system 
During his time at the Federal Reserve, Triffin became also more involved in matters of 
the international monetary system. Triffin was at the inaugural meeting of the Bretton 
Woods Agreements on 1 July 1944 (Federal Reserve Board Minutes, 12/04/1946, FRA). 
He also attended a special meeting of the Board of Governors on 2 March 1945 in which 
Harry D. White, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and Edward W. Bernstein, then 
Assistant Director of Monetary Research at the Treasury, discussed the Bretton Woods 
Agreements and their implications on national and international monetary policies 
(Federal Reserve Board Minutes, 02/03/1945, FRA). Triffin further wrote a first important 
essay on the international monetary system, entitled "National Central Banking and the 
International Economy" (Triffin, 1947), which included an extensive discussion of the role 
of the International Monetary Fund in the new international monetary system. It was 
published in the collection of the Post-war Economic Studies of the Federal Reserve3  and 
was presented in various conferences4. 
 
Former Bank of Italy Governor Paolo Baffi paid significant attention to this article (Maes, 
2013). Baffi pointed out that Triffin was "the first economist to underline the fundamental 
inconsistency between the stability of the international monetary system and national 
sovereignty in economic policy-making" (Baffi, 1988, 16). Furthermore, as already clearly 
evident in the title, is the focus on two geographical entities: national economies and the 
world. Only at the end of the article is multilateralism of trade mentioned. 
 
In the introduction to his article, Triffin underlined how the world had changed with the 
Great Depression and World War II. In his view, "managed currencies" were unavoidable. 
"The events of the thirties, the increasing influence of Keynesian economics, and finally 
                                                
3 Initially Triffin’s paper was entitled "The United States in World Trade and Finance" and was scheduled to 
be published with papers by Walter A. Gardner (substituted by G. Haberler) and Lloyd A. Meltzer (Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, November 1945: 1107). 
4 More specifically at the first conference of Inter-American Central Banking Technicians, held in Mexico City 
during the second half of August 1946 under the auspices of the Bank of Mexico; at the 59th Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association, held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, January 23rd-26th 1947. 
He also published the paper in El Trimestre economico and in the Review of Economic Studies in 1946 
before it was published by the FED. 
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the financial impact of World War II have destroyed the institutional and ideological 
framework of the automatic gold standard... Any attempt to enforce rigid solutions 
patterned after orthodox gold standard doctrines would be even more futile in the postwar 
period than it has proved to be in the interwar period." (Triffin, 1947, 47-48). 
 
As in his earlier 1937 article, Triffin was very critical of the classical theory, which ascribed 
balance of payments disequilibria to international cost and price disparities. He raised two 
main elements of critique: “First, they fail to distinguish between a fundamental 
disequilibrium in one country's international position and world-wide disturbances in 
balances of payments associated with cyclical fluctuations. Secondly, the explanation of 
the readjustment of a country's balance of payments is vitiated by the underlying and 
totally unrealistic assumption of near-perfect competition between nations of roughly equal 
strength and importance in world trade." (Triffin, 1947, 55). They show how Triffin’s 
perception was marked by his studies on business cycles and imperfect competition 
theory. 
 
Triffin further raised the question whether the international monetary system in the 
interwar period was a gold standard or a sterling exchange standard. In his view, as Great 
Britain was the major centre of world trade and finance, changes in the British discount 
rate had significant effects on capital movements. Consequently, the British discount 
policy immediately affected not only the domestic economy and prices but also other 
countries, thus transmitting British cyclical fluctuations abroad. Eichengreen (1992) called 
this the "Triffin effect".  
 
Triffin felt this had important policy implications, putting international liquidity at the core of 
the international monetary system. "Whenever balance of payments disequilibria are due, 
not to international price disparities, but to accidental factors or to cyclical fluctuations in 
foreign income and demand, compensatory policies should be followed to the fullest 
possible extent. This requires a high level of international reserves, especially in raw 
material and food producing countries, and the willingness to spend these reserves 
liberally in times of crisis and to accumulate them during prosperous years." (Triffin, 
1947, 80). 
 
As mentioned, Triffin, like in traditional international monetary analyses, distinguished two 
geographical entities: national economies and the world. Moreover, he held a largely 
positive view on the role of the newly created IMF in the world economy, provided that the 
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IMF accepted the importance of national objectives of stability and economic growth5 and 
followed his analysis of distinguishing between cyclical and permanent balance of 
payments imbalances: "The success of the International Monetary Fund will largely 
depend on the progressive development and general acceptance of new canons of 
international monetary behaviour, to replace the previous "rules of the game" code. ... 
They should recognize the primacy of domestic goals of stability and high levels of 
economic performance, and distinguish strongly between cyclical and fundamental 
disequilibria in the balances of payments." (Triffin, 1947, 63) 6. 
 
Triffin was quite optimistic about the new international monetary system with the IMF at its 
core, "A more constructive approach toward the problem is now in the process of effective 
realization. The recently created International Monetary Fund is specifically designed to 
promote international monetary stability through the concerted action of all member 
countries". Triffin argued that the IMF disposed of two important advantages: the financial 
resources at its disposal and its influence on member countries’ economic policies. "First, 
the Fund has the financial machinery to help the members to maintain free and stable 
exchanges by supplementing their gold and foreign exchange resources in case of need. 
… There is now an alternative to unilateral resort to currency depreciation or exchange 
restrictions during a period of severe even though temporary exchange shortages. 
Secondly, the Fund will wield a degree of influence over policy decisions of member 
countries. In some cases the Fund has only the power to make recommendations, or the 
right to be consulted. In others, such as parity changes or the establishment of exchange 
control, action by a member is subject to the Fund's authorization or approval". (Triffin, 
1947, 46-47). Furthermore, Triffin believed that the IMF might develop a leadership and 
moral influence "far beyond the scope of mere official, formal recommendations" (Triffin, 
1947: 53).  
 
In Triffin’s view, the Bretton Woods Agreements provided an opportunity to avoid autarctic 
excesses in the monetary field. As the IMF could provide for the financing of temporary 
deficits, countries did not need to impose exchange controls: "Member countries agree to 
cede to the Fund a considerable measure of control over modifications in their exchange 
rates or the imposition of exchange restrictions. To make possible this partial renunciation 
of national monetary sovereignty, the International Monetary Fund undertakes to make 
available to member countries, in times of need, additional exchange reserves necessary 
to finance temporary deficits in their balance of payments" (Triffin, 1947, 54). 
                                                
5 The problem of the compatibility of national economic policy objectives with external equilibrium was 
central in the economic debate since the elaboration of the new monetary arrangements. See Cesarano, 
2009: 145-152; 170-171. 
6 Haberler (1947: 88-90) was critical of Triffin's distinction. He argued that Triffin misinterpreted the classical 
theory and ignored the reciprocal influences between cyclical and fundamental disequilibrium. 
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Triffin observed further that the IMF was especially well equipped to deal with cases of 
(temporary) balance of payments deficits. "It is precisely this situation which the 
International Fund is so well organized to meet. The drain of reserves is arrested, or 
moderated, by an indirect extension of credit by the surplus countries to the deficit 
countries, through their accounts with the Fund. In this manner the deficit countries are 
enabled to avoid recourse to internal deflation, currency devaluation, exchange control, or 
other restrictive policies." (Triffin, 1947, 65).  
 
Moreover, Triffin, marked by the Great Depression, had a clear ranking of policy 
instruments, preferring exchange controls to devaluation. "When reserves are insufficient, 
foreign or international assistance - such as is contemplated under the International 
Monetary Fund - will be necessary. Failing this, exchange control should be used as a 
third line of defence, in order to continue compensatory policies and avoid the greater 
evils inseparable from deflation or currency devaluation." (Triffin 1947: 80). 
4. The European economy and payments systems after WW II 
At the end of WW II, European currencies were not convertible and intra-European 
payments were characterized by a series of bilateral payments agreements and trade and 
foreign exchange controls. The bilateral arrangements typically consisted of licences and 
quotas for imports and exports, and foreign exchange was allocated by central banks with 
commercial banks as agents (Tew, 1988). 
 
The rationale for the maintenance of controls and bilateralism was the shortage of 
international reserves, especially dollars. After WW II, European countries were 
confronted with war-related damage and dislocation of their productive capacities, while 
the United States was the only source of capital equipment for reconstruction. Western 
European countries could not increase their exports of manufactures and other goods, 
since inputs from the United States were needed to restart production. As a result, 
European countries had massive balance of payments deficits. Against this background, 
bilateral agreements and exchange and trade controls were used by European countries 
to restrict their imports from the rest of Europe in order to maximize the availability of 
dollars and gold that might be used to purchase imports from the dollar area.  
 
The dollar shortage was also aggravated by overvalued official parities, set in December 
1946 (Bordo, Eichengreen, 1993: 39). At that time, the IMF did not consider a devaluation 
as an adequate policy instrument for European countries’ payments disequilibria. So 
argued the Managing Director, the Belgian Camille Gutt (1948), that exchange rate 
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adjustments were not effective under the conditions prevailing in 1946 in Europe, since 
balance of payments deficits reflected an incapacity to export. Gutt further emphasised 
that a currency devaluation might provoke inflationary pressures. In his view, inflation, 
both the inflation resulting from domestic monetary and fiscal policies and the latent 
inflation caused by the maintenance of wartime exchange restrictions and rationing, was a 
major cause of the continued and recurrent European balance of payments deficits.  
 
There were significant debates among economists at the time. Several took a free market 
approach (for instance, Friedman). They believed that economic reconstruction and the 
liberation of trade in Europe could be established only by free market forces and the 
adoption of market-determined rates of exchange. However, others, like Robert Triffin and 
Guido Carli, emphasized that several structural factors impeded the successful operation 
of market forces in Europe’s postwar economies: "The low level of gold and dollar 
reserves and of industrial productive capacity sharply emphasised the fact that the 
prerequisites of a system of free convertibility and those of free international exchange did 
not exist in postwar Europe. In addition, given the political instability in many countries, the 
social consequences of such policies were considered to be a major deterrent to their 
implementation" (Carli, 1982, 162). Later analysis would support this view (Milward, 1987, 
Eichengreen, 1993). 
 
A crucial development in 1947 was that the United States moved from a stance of 
doggedly defending its creditor prerogatives (under Morgenthau and White) to one of 
reviving global growth. The change in US policy, with the Marshall Plan at its core, was 
essentially based on a new perception of US geopolitical interests, with the Cold War 
taking centre stage. Moreover, a strong European economy would constitute an important 
market for US exports. The Marshall Plan was proposed in June 1947 and enacted in April 
1948 under the Economic Cooperation Act.  
 
With the Marshall Plan, the US government opted for an economic reconstruction in 
Europe based on trade on a multilateral basis. It was also crucial for solving the stalled 
situation of the intra-European payments system, as it provided grants and loans in dollars 
to finance Western European deficits for four years. The management of the Marshall 
Plan was conferred to a new agency, the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA). The Plan 
required recipient countries to cooperate in the allocation of aid and in a process of 
liberalization of trade and payments. Accordingly, the Committee for European Economic 
Cooperation (CEEC) was created in July 1947, renamed Organisation of European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948. 
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The Western European economy only recovered very slowly, despite the Marshall Plan as 
well as the intra-European payments agreements signed after 1948. Following heated 
discussions throughout the spring and summer, the United Kingdom devalued its currency 
by 30.5 % on 18 September 1949. The major European currencies followed in quick 
succession. 
 
In the meantime, on the basis of experience with the intra-European payments 
agreements, proposals for more ambitious schemes were being discussed within both the 
OEEC and the ECA. In the OEEC, the main drive came from the Benelux countries’ 
delegation under the influence of the Belgian Hubert Ansiaux, who chaired the OEEC 
Committee of Financial Experts. Ansiaux proposed the multilateralization of credits, with 
the credit margins being backed by dollar aid (Péters, 2001). In the ECA, the Planning 
Group developed the earliest recorded proposals for the creation of a clearing mechanism 
between European countries7. It considered a European clearing mechanism as an 
instrument both to solve the transferability problem and a first institutional step to promote 
closer European economic and monetary integration (Hogan, 1987: 271-273). While 
ECA's ideas were supported by the State Department, they were not shared by the US 
Treasury which was concerned that regional integration could be a challenge to the 
authority and responsibility of the IMF (Kaplan, Schleiminger, 1989: 40).  
5. Triffin and the EPU 
Triffin went to the IMF in July 1946 as acting head of the Exchange Control Division 
(Wilson, 2015: 377). On 1 January 1947, he was appointed Head of Division. In 
November 1947, Triffin became Head of the Department of Trade and Exchange Practices 
and Financial Agreements. In these functions, he dealt with the issue of exchange 
controls, par values and the European countries' post-WW II monetary problems, joining 
IMF missions to supervise the monetary and economic developments of some of these 
countries too8. In October 1948, Triffin was appointed to lead the IMF Representative 
Office in Europe as Head Technical Representative of the IMF in Europe. In this position, 
he took part in the negotiations for trade and payments agreements to restore 
multilateralism in Europe.  
 
In December 1949 he joined the ECA in Paris as Special Advisor on Policy to the Director 
Trade and Payments, Henry Tasca. In this role, he contributed to both the preparation of 
the ECA plan that was proposed in December 1949 and the work of the Inner Group of the 
                                                
7 The proposal for a European Clearing Union was framed by Theodore Geiger in September 1946 when he 
was an official at the US Embassy in London and was further elaborated when Geiger met Harold van 
Buren Cleveland in London (Kaplan, Schleiminger, 1989: 362). 
8 Triffin joined the IMF missions in France (1945, 1946, 1948, 1949), Belgium (1946, 1948), the Netherlands 
(1948) and Italy (1947-1948). 
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OEEC. Triffin has been described "a consummate financial technician, eagerly advancing 
ingenious and usually successful methods for solving the mechanical problems posed by 
an automatic clearing system" (Kaplan, Schleiminger, 1989: 39). He was also active in 
designing technical solutions to the EPU Agreement that were conducive to the 
participation of Belgium (Péters, 2000) and the United Kingdom (Kaplan, Schleiminger, 
1989). 
5.1 Triffin’s proposal for a European clearing union 
In the fall of 1947, Triffin wrote a study with Raymond Bertrand analysing the European 
payments and trade situation. In this study, published as an internal IMF memorandum in 
December 1947, he outlined a proposal for a multilateral clearing arrangement. 
 
Triffin was very critical of the bilateral payments agreements, especially because of their 
effects on intra-European trade. He argued that while bilateral payments agreements 
allowed European countries to manage their external balances and conserve hard 
currency, the limited size of the loans granted under the agreements and their bilateral 
nature forced the bilateral balancing of intra-European trade (Triffin, 1947: 2). Such 
bilateral balancing involved discrimination among import sources and export markets, 
causing distortions in European trade. Countries purchased goods from countries with 
which they had a bilateral surplus or that were willing to grant further loans, rather than 
making purchases from producers offering the lowest price. Bilateral balancing might thus 
imply that countries diverted imports from lower to higher cost sources and from goods 
that would be essential to goods that would not be essential for reconstruction aims 
(Triffin, 1947: 2-3). Therefore, bilateralism slowed down the European recovery.  
 
Triffin advanced three proposals (Triffin, 1947: 3). First, further loans beyond those 
provided under the existing agreements were necessary to prevent trade from 
degenerating into barter deals. Second, credit should be provided on a multilateral basis 
to prevent countries from resorting to discriminatory practices for bilateral balancing. Third, 
the credit lines extended to deficit countries should be limited in size, in order not to 
relieve them from reducing unnecessary imports, and provided on a multilateral basis in 
order to prevent them from being used for less essential imports from the lending 
countries. 
 
On this basis, he proposed that European countries substituted the network of bilateral 
agreements with a multilateral agreement to create a European Clearing Union in which: 
"the total credit commitments made by each country to other Clearing members would be 
paid into the Clearing in its own currency, and the country would receive an equivalent 
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balance in the Clearing which it could then use to settle the current account deficits with 
any Clearing member" (Triffin, 1947: 4; emphasis in the original). The payments would not 
be made on a bilateral basis but by debiting the paying country's balance in the Clearing 
and crediting the balance of the receiving country.  
 
Triffin further favoured the introduction of an intra-European unit of account, called 
"European dollar" or "interfranc", to express the balances in the Clearing (Triffin, 1947: 4). 
It would become a recurring theme in Triffin’s proposals in the ensuing decades.  
 
Triffin argued also that, compared to the existing bilateral system, multilateral clearing had 
the advantage of promoting fuller use of credit commitments. Yet, the cumulative impact of 
net deficits and surpluses might lead to an exhaustion of the deficit countries' credit 
availabilities in the creditor countries' currencies. Multilateral utilization of the Clearing's 
balances might thus be suspended with respect to the payments in the scarce currencies 
(Triffin, 1947: 5). According to Triffin, external financial resources to limit and finance the 
net overall intra-European deficits were therefore necessary for the viability of the 
multilateral clearing arrangement.  
 
Triffin suggested two sources of external financing. The first was the Marshall Plan. The 
second source was the IMF. Under Bretton Woods rules, the IMF could provide European 
currencies as well as dollars, if the Marshall Plan proved to be insufficient to cover 
European countries' dollar deficit (Triffin, 1947: 8). 
 
In the debate on the transferability of the European currencies at that time, Triffin's 
proposal for a European Clearing Union was very similar to the boldest proposals 
advanced within both the OEEC Payments Committee and the ECA in the same period 
(Kaplan, Schleiminger, 1989: 34-40). Special attention was paid by Triffin to a system of 
incentives and deterrents. The common unit of account would work as an exchange rate 
guarantee for intra-European payments; the introduction of a ceiling for debtor countries’ 
drawing rights would encourage them to adopt policies to adjust payments imbalances; 
finally, the involvement of the IMF in the financing of net deficits would provide further 
guarantees to both debtor and creditor countries. But, right from the start, Triffin’s ideas 
met with resistance within the IMF, especially from Managing Board officials, and 
particularly from the American representative who came from the Treasury Department 
(Horsefield, 1969a: 220-221). 
 
In line with his general philosophy, Triffin’s memoranda paid close attention to the need to 
strike a balance between financing and adjustment of payments surpluses and deficits. 
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More specifically, he suggested that: "Whenever a country is … entitled to gold settlement, 
it will extend to this latter country a new credit equivalent to half of the amount involved in 
the settlement, thus reducing the gold settlement by one half. If no provision for settlement 
exists or can be agreed to, half of the transfer will be settled in gold or dollars, and the 
other half through accumulation of the currency in which the drawing right is denominated" 
(Triffin, 1949b: 5). 
 
This solution involved the so-called "matching credit formula", under which payments 
would be settled simultaneously partly through loans and partly in gold or dollars. Triffin 
later revised the formula, advocating a gradual increase in the cash element in the 
settlements, as deficit countries made cumulative use of credit facilities. So the ratio of 
gold payments to borrowing facilities for the settlement of the deficits would increase 
gradually when the borrowing ceiling is approached by debtors and vice versa for creditor 
countries. 
 
In Triffin’s view, this system of settlements would support progress from bilateralism to 
regional interconvertibility. On the one hand, it "would give some incentive to all countries 
to limit their Western Hemisphere deficit and to maximise their European exports", while 
on the other, it "would facilitate some accumulation of monetary reserves which would 
help to restore currency stability and smooth out balance of payments difficulties after the 
termination of [the Marshall Plan]" (Triffin, 1949a: 6). Moreover, it would recreate 
incentives for the correction of surpluses and deficits in intra-European trade: "The 
obligation imposed upon surplus countries to refinance one half of their intra-European 
surplus exceeding the estimates would limit … the incentive to build up surpluses through 
a contraction in their imports from other participating countries. On the other hand, the 
system would impose some hardship on the countries which fail to reach their estimated 
goals. This, however, appears necessary as an incentive to maximum efforts and as a 
discipline to stimulate adequate monetary and exchange policies" (Triffin, 1949a: 6-7). 
 
Triffin further emphasised the need for "specific provisions and authority to bring pressure 
for the readjustment of excessive deficit and surplus positions through changes in fiscal, 
credit, and monetary policies, in exchange rates, etc." (Triffin, 1949d: 447). The authority 
would be conferred to the Managing Board in the EPU Agreement, whose aims were to 
maintain continuous consultation and mutual reviews of each country's policies and 
overall position in the Payments Union. It would also provide loan facilities to extreme 
debtors but only if they adjusted their policies to permit a return to equilibrium within the 
system. In addition, Triffin suggested that creditor countries should take action to limit their 
surpluses through further liberalization of imports, while partner countries that 
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encountered heavy balance of payments pressures should be released temporarily from 
such commitments. 
5.2 The European Payments Union 
The debate on the European convertibility problem was revived by Hoffman's speech to 
the OEEC Ministers in October 1949. At the end of that year, the ECA and OEEC put 
forward their proposals for an intra-European payments scheme. Both plans suggested 
setting up a clearing mechanism, so that each country would be expected to seek a 
balance with all members of the Union as a whole, thus minimizing the need for dollars to 
settle imbalances; moreover, each country would have access to credit from the Union in 
order to accommodate temporary fluctuations in the country's position and permit some 
leeway for adjusting economic policies to regain equilibrium. Yet, the ECA plan was more 
sophisticated. It included provisions that would press member countries to adopt monetary 
and fiscal policies conducive to a balanced intra-European position. The ECA plan also 
provided for an authority with discretionary powers on member countries' national policies 
(see Kaplan, Schleiminger, 1989: 31-40).  
 
The European Payments Union was established on 19 September 1950 by the OEEC 
countries. It was designed as a two-year transitional arrangement, renewable on a yearly 
basis. It was based on an automatic settlement mechanism. Accordingly, each country’s 
net balances with each other country were reported at the end of every month to the Bank 
for International Settlements, which cancelled offsetting claims (OEEC, 1950). Remaining 
balances were consolidated, leaving each country with liabilities or claims against the 
Union as a whole, as the ECA plan had proposed. These net balances would in part be 
financed by credit quota and in part, as the liabilities grew, settled in dollars and gold. A 
single monetary unit, the EPU unit of account, was adopted so as to have a common 
denominator for all the accounts deriving from the settlements among the central banks. 
Triffin played a key role in these negotiations. Furthermore, financing of net settlements 
would be provided by a grant of $350 million of Marshall Aid to the EPU. As observed by 
Carli, "the failure of the monetary compensation agreements on a European level was 
thus salvaged by the injection of dollar funds and by Triffin, who was the catalyst that 
converted the whole plan into what became the European Payments Union" (Carli, 
1982, 163). 
 
The management of the EPU was conferred to a Managing Board, composed of financial 
experts. When a member country threatened to exhaust its quota, the EPU Managing 
Board could advise and recommend corrective policies after reporting to the OEEC 
Council. The Board could also extend supplementary loans to countries that had 
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exhausted their EPU quotas, attach conditions to their provision, and monitor domestic 
policy adjustments, while officials from countries receiving exceptional credits were 
required to attend the monthly meeting of the EPU Board for questioning and submit 
monthly memoranda for the Board’s review. 
 
As already mentioned, the European Payments Union needed a monetary unit (in which 
all accounts could be denominated) for both the compensation mechanism and the 
multilateralization of net debts or claims to be able to function properly. This was a 
sensitive issue, as the choice of this unit would also determine the exchange rate 
guarantee attached to the Union’s credit operations (Triffin 1957: 172). The EPU 
agreement created a special EPU unit of account, initially defined by a gold content equal 
to that of the 1950 US dollar. This gold content could be changed at any time by a 
decision of the OEEC Council. However, the unanimity rule for OEEC decisions made any 
such change highly improbable: the creditors would always have an interest in vetoing a 
devaluation and the debtors an interest in vetoing an appreciation of the EPU unit (Triffin 
1957: 173). So, it was stipulated that no country could veto a change equivalent to (or 
smaller than) the appreciation or depreciation of its own currency. This effectively implied 
a definition of the EPU unit of account in terms of the member currency which remained 
most stable (in terms of gold). Triffin claims paternity for this formula and points to its 
significance for the future of European monetary integration: "My own objective in 
proposing and defending this formula … was also to define a form of exchange guarantee 
that might be used later to encourage a resumption of capital movements in Europe, and 
a monetary unit that might be adopted in future agreements on European economic 
integration" (Triffin 1957: 173). 
 
Initially, the EPU was confronted with diffidence on the part of the existing international 
institutions. Notwithstanding the IMF Managing Director’s plea for active IMF involvement 
in European matters, the EPU was considered by various IMF Executive Board officials as 
being at odds with the philosophy of monetary reconstruction embodied in the Bretton 
Woods Agreement (de Vries, 1969). The BIS had also a "fairly ambiguous" attitude 
towards the EPU (Toniolo, 2005: 333). On the one hand, it provided the technical skills 
and banking functions because of its clearing agent role, while on the other hand, it 
believed that the EPU was against the restoration of free exchange markets. 
 
So, with the European Payments Union, Triffin introduced a new geographical entity in his 
analysis: the region. Triffin became a partisan of monetary regionalism, not only as a 
solution to the internal imbalances of Europe but also because of dollar scarcity. 
Moreover, the regional solution of returning to currency convertibility was less risky than a 
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global approach. When the EPU was established, Triffin was appointed Special Advisor 
and Alternate US Representative on the Managing Board. 
5.3 The functioning of the EPU 
A few days before the entry into force of the EPU Agreement, the EPU had to face its first 
test with the German payments crisis. Even if production and exports had increased 
rapidly after the 1948 currency reform, the German economy in 1950 lagged behind most 
other EPU countries, as post-war reconstruction had started much later. Moreover, in 
1950, US aid was being scaled down and, as a result, German imports shifted 
substantially from the dollar to the EPU area, enlarging Germany's EPU deficits. Finally, 
the outbreak of the Korean War worsened its balance of payments deficits. It all led to a 
rapid exhaustion of the German EPU quota (Kaplan, Schleiminger, 1988: 99-101). 
 
The EPU Managing Board arranged for a temporary line of credit with a program of 
financial and economic readjustment policies (including commitments to maintain the 
existing exchange rate, to abstain from any deficit financing and to raise taxes) to be 
adopted by Germany under its supervision. Moreover, the other EPU countries should 
endeavour to liberalize goods of interest to Germany, to grant generous quotas to German 
goods not on their free list, and to refrain from seeking unreasonably large quotas for their 
own exports to Germany. At first, the result of this program was disappointing. A temporary 
suspension of trade liberalization by the OEEC was therefore decided, that was put under 
the supervision of a group of independent experts in order to preclude a scramble for 
German licenses and to ensure an allocation of licenses that would minimize the harmful 
impact of German restrictions on the weaker members of the OEEC. Triffin pointed out the 
"revolutionary character of this decision" as "it involved a renunciation by each country of 
its bilateral bargaining strength and sovereignty for protecting its national interests in the 
middle of a dangerous crisis" (Triffin, 1957: 182). 
 
These measures had an immediate impact on the German balance of payments. 
Consequently, by the end of March 1951, the special loan was repaid and exchange 
controls were removed. By the spring of 1953, Germany had become the largest creditor 
in the EPU (see Kaplan, Schleiminger, 1988: 107-113).  
 
The Managing Board's handling of the German payments crisis was in line with Triffin's 
vision for the sustainable functioning of an international monetary system. It mixed the 
provision of international liquidity as a temporary relief - to avoid the need for restrictions 
on exchange transactions that would have deeply affected the economy of other EPU 
countries - with economic policy coordination among EPU countries. 
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The management of the German payments crisis was widely recognised as a success, 
with a Managing Board that was endowed, as Triffin later said, "with a prestige and 
authority far beyond the most optimistic expectations of the promoters of the EPU 
Agreement" (Triffin, 1957: 182). The way in which the German payments problems had 
been surmounted became a model for the crises the EPU had to confront (Kaplan, 
Schleiminger, 1989). It also demonstrated, for Triffin, that the "region" could constitute an 
appropriate level for effective crisis management.  
 
Two particular aspects of crisis management were emphasised. The first was the use of 
macroeconomic policies, something that was highlighted in the Federal Reserve Bulletin 
in December 1951 (Kaplan and Schleiminger, 1989: 116) and also by Triffin (1957: 182). 
The second aspect was the advantage of a cooperative approach developed under an 
effective (regional) institution (Kaplan and Schleiminger, 1989: 116). As Triffin later 
observed, it left, "a deep impression on other countries" (Triffin, 1957: 182), facilitating 
acceptance of their responsibility in resolving balance of payments problems. It also 
helped to reconcile a tightening up of the EPU settlement rules with further progress 
towards trade liberalization (Triffin, 1957: 208). Later analyses of the EPU would support 
this idea (Eichengreen, 1993; Oatley, 2001). 
 
6.  Triffin’s criticisms of the IMF policy strategy 
As seen, in his 1947 essay, Triffin was initially quite optimistic about the role the IMF could 
play in the world economy. Gradually however, Triffin would become more critical of the 
IMF, as Triffin moved towards a regional approach, while the IMF remained with a world-
wide approach. 
 
According to Triffin, the IMF’s choice to remain aside from the European payments 
problems resulted in "a generalised distrust in IMF policy and machinery" of international 
monetary cooperation and consultations (Triffin, 1949d: 183). Triffin pressed for IMF 
involvement in the EPU at both the IMF and the OEEC. In a letter to Gutt, the IMF 
Managing Director, he wrote: "The only immediate action that would make sense would be 
for you to come to Paris with a broad delegation of authority, not necessarily to commit the 
Fund, but to enter into close contact with the OEEC Secretariat and national delegations 
at the highest political level, and pave the ground for an intelligent discussion of the 
problem at the board at a later stage". Moreover, he added, "I have not the slightest doubt 
either the need for a close working relationship between the Fund and the European 
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clearing. I have pressed this point myself at every occasion" (Letter from Triffin to Gutt, 
January 17th, 1950; emphasis in the original, RTA).  
 
Triffin acknowledged that the Bretton Woods statutes were limited with regard to the 
problems of exchange liberalization. Article XIV gave countries the right to maintain 
restrictions on payments and transfers for current transactions for a transitory period 
lasting five years. Yet, he believed that the Fund’s policy, which had to promote both 
exchange freedom and exchange stability, had been devoted mainly to the second 
objective in the post-WW II years. 
 
According to Triffin, the Fund’s arguments for exchange rate stability had been right in the 
immediate post-WW II years. Exchange rates could not constitute a meaningful 
mechanism of adjustment for European balance of payments disequilibria as Europe 
lacked export capacity. Against this background, trade and exchange controls could be 
expected to reduce the outflow of foreign exchange and reallocate it to those imports 
which the economy most urgently needed. By contrast, exchange rate readjustments 
could fuel domestic inflation, given the excessive rates of monetary expansion during the 
war and the early post-war years (Triffin, 1948c). 
 
However, in the course of 1949, Triffin became a partisan of exchange rate adjustments, 
thus going against the official IMF position. In the summer, when exchange realignments 
of European currencies were discussed, Triffin wrote various memoranda in favour of 
exchange rate revisions. He became convinced that the exchange rates not only did not 
correspond to the fundamentals, but that they were also impeding trade liberalization. He 
argued that, "the liberalization of controls is inextricably tied, for most countries, with a 
revision of exchange rates. Pursuing either policy also means implementing the other. The 
accent should be put on the first, (…) for the revision of rates would merely facilitate the 
relaxation of controls, while the relaxation of controls would compel exchange revisions" 
(Triffin, 1949: 185). 
 
In Triffin's view, the IMF had not only to authorize the exchange rate revisions, as 
envisaged in the Bretton Woods statutes, but also to "facilitate the process rather than 
hamper it by cumbersome, and often unrealistic, requirements" in order to "best promote 
the attainment of par values which are both stable and effective" (Triffin, 1949d: 185). He 
suggested that a new par value had to be determined after "a transitional period of 
experimentation" (Triffin, 1949d: 185). Throughout this period any member country would 
be engaged in a consultation process with the Fund and the exchange rate might be 
subjected to fluctuations. Specific rules had to be followed in order to avoid abuses of 
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exchange flexibility and to preserve, in cooperation with the Fund, the orderly character of 
adjustments9.  
 
Triffin further argued that his proposal would not require any formal revision of the Bretton 
Woods statutes. Moreover, it would provide for "some regionalization of the Fund 
machinery" at both policy and staff level (Triffin, 1949d: 188). At policy level, the 
regionalisation would be accomplished "if European Governors of the Fund agreed to 
meet in Europe at frequent intervals to discuss their common monetary problems in 
relation to the Fund, with a high officer of the Fund who would ensure the proper liaison 
with the Fund's management and Executive Board in Washington". At staff level, Triffin 
recognized that a right step in the direction of a regionalisation of IMF machinery had 
been taken with the appointment of technical representatives abroad. Yet, he 
recommended that the offices abroad should be expanded and that the IMF should 
provide an adequate supervision on their activities. 
 
It might be interesting to make a comparison here between the views of Triffin and 
Friedman. Indeed, Friedman, in the fall of 1950, was a consultant to the Finance and 
Trade Division of the Office of Special Representative for Europe of the US Economic 
Cooperation Administration. His famous paper, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 
had its origin in a memorandum for the ECA, which he also discussed with Triffin 
(Friedman 1950: 187 fn)10. 
 
Friedman advanced two arguments in favour of flexible exchange rates: the freedom of 
each country to pursue internal stability and the attainment of unrestricted multilateral 
trade. With this second argument, he was close to Triffin’s analysis of the European 
economy in 1949. According to Friedman there was no way of predicting in advance the 
precise economic effects of reductions of trade barriers. “All that is clear is that the impact 
of such reductions will vary from country to country and industry to industry and that many 
of the impacts will be highly indirect and not at all in the particular areas liberalized. The 
very process of liberalization will therefore add substantial and unpredictable pressures on 
balance of payments over and above those that would occur in any event. These 
pressures would make any system of rigid exchange rates appropriate to the initial 
position almost certainly inappropriate to the final position and to intermediate positions. 
And there seems no way to decide on the appropriate final exchange rates in advance; 
they must be reached by trial and error. Thus, even if the ultimate goal were a new system 
                                                
9  As Jacques de Larosière observed, there is here a remarkable similarity between the 1949 proposals of 
Triffin and those of the IMF in 1971: letting exchange rates fluctuate during a transitory period, under IMF 
surveillance, to find new par rates. 
10  It is interesting to note that Friedman (1941) had written a review of Triffin’s book on monopolistic 
competition wherein he defends Marshall’s notion of industry, which was criticized by Triffin. 
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of rigid exchange rates, it seems almost essential to have flexibility in the interim period.” 
(Friedman, 1950: 197-198). 
 
A crucial difference between Friedman and Triffin was that Friedman was completely 
sceptical of Triffin’s distinction between temporary and fundamental payments imbalances 
and the use of compensatory policies in case of temporary disequilibria: “The use of the 
monetary reserves as the sole reliance to meet small and temporary strains on balances 
of payments and of other devices to meet larger and more extended or more basic strains 
is an understandable objective of economic policy and comes close to summarizing the 
philosophy underlying the International Monetary Fund. Unfortunately, it is not a realistic, 
feasible, or desirable policy.”. In Friedman’s view, it was not easy to know whether strains 
in the balance of payments were temporary or permanent. Moreover, there was a 
tendency to rely too much on reserves: “Corrective steps are postponed in the hope that 
things will right themselves until the state of the reserves forces drastic and frequently ill-
advised action.” (Friedman, 1950: 172). 
 
7. Triffin's defence of the EPU 
7.1  A discriminatory trade and payments area? 
When the EPU was established, it came under fire from several economists. Many 
believed that the EPU created a discriminatory trade and payments area that would be at 
odds with the philosophy of the post-WW II international system. For instance, during a 
conference in the early 1950s at Princeton University, several participants expressed 
“strong doubts” as to whether the EPU would not perpetuate structural imbalances rather 
than remedy them. Ragnar Nurkse, then at Columbia University, argued that: "I am rather 
suspicious of all proposals about stabilization loans or clearing pools. To my mind, they 
are methods of concealed relief or aid based on the wrong criteria. Countries will get help 
that are not the most deserving recipients." (as quoted in Knorr, 1952, 28). 
 
Triffin made the rebuttal. He pointed to the success with which EPU members had 
liberalized trade among themselves. He insisted that the EPU had actually made for less 
discrimination although, as Viner pointed out, it was theoretically possible for over-all 
discrimination to be raised by the skilful removal of discriminatory practices within a 
regional bloc. Moreover, while Triffin acknowledged that the EPU was discriminatory 
towards dollar imports, he also claimed that the gradual liberalization of intra-European 
payments would boost European competitiveness: "It certainly forced the higher-cost 
countries within the EPU region to compete with the lower-cost members, and this is an 
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indispensable preparation for full-convertibility". All this would contribute to the 
readjustment of the European cost and price pattern vis-à-vis the US, alleviating so “dollar 
scarcity”, the fundamental imbalance in the world economy. 
 
Later, Triffin (1957) objected to the criticisms on the basis of the "trade creating" and 
"trade diverting" categories, introduced by Viner (1950) in order to analyse the effects of a 
custom union on trade flows. Triffin pointed out that the presumption of trade-diverting and 
trade-creating impact must be assessed by considering the concrete circumstances 
surrounding the regional agreements. Even if he admitted that the EPU "entailed a certain 
degree of discrimination against non-EPU members", Triffin argued that cooperation in the 
EPU Agreement was extended to an area where countries' economies are highly 
interdependent and whose total trade accounted for nearly 60 % of world trade. This 
allowed efficiency-enhancing arbitrage to operate powerfully, minimizing price distortions. 
He also affirmed that price distortions were further minimized by the fact that the 
economies of Europe, notwithstanding their troubles, possessed a number of important 
industries which allowed intra-EPU trade to drive prices down to the levels established by 
the lowest-cost producers. As Triffin argued: "Intra-European trade liberalization often 
weakened, through transit trade and triangular transactions, the effectiveness of dollar 
discrimination itself". Indeed, the US was not always the lowest cost producer of particular 
goods, "for many categories of goods, the lowest European prices which [domestic 
producers] had to meet – Swiss prices for some goods, Belgian or German prices for 
others, etc. – were probably as competitive as those of any third countries, including the 
United States" (Triffin, 1957: 207). In the later literature on customs unions these 
elements, like a large economic area and more competitive economies, were singled out 
as factors favouring trade creation (Robson 1987, 22). Moreover, Triffin argued that one 
should also look at the "dynamic" effects of the EPU: "The trade-creating and trade-
diverting effects of regional integration cannot be fully appraised by looking only at the 
immediate and direct trade concessions incorporated in a regional agreement. Indirect 
policy and incentives are far more significant for arriving at a broad judgment of the 
over-all impact of the agreement on future trade patterns" (Triffin, 1957: 262). In the EPU 
Agreement, "indirect policy and incentives" were related the provision of stabilization 
credits by the creditor countries to the debtor members of the system; the willingness of 
the creditor countries to speed up their own liberalization measures beyond the formal 
commitments agreed to by all members, and to release temporarily from such 
commitments partner countries which encountered heavy balance of payments pressures; 
the willingness to submit to international discussion and scrutiny the whole range of their 
economic policies; and the existence of a highly effective machinery for continuous 
consultation and negotiation among members. 
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The role of EPU in the post-WW II European reconstruction has been emphasized in the 
recent literature. Milward argued that the EPU, and the European Coal and Steel 
Community, were the “pillars of the reconstruction” of Western Europe (Milward, 1987: 
470). The EPU was designed “not just to permit but also to encourage national policies of 
expansion” (Milward, 1987: 487). Also Eichengreen comes to the conclusion that, "the 
EPU was critical by virtue of its positive spillovers for domestic and international political 
economy. These spill-overs in turn contributed importantly to the post-war growth 
process." (Eichengreen 1993: 95). According to Eichengreen, the discriminatory features 
of the EPU, which were emphasised at the time, did appear to have affected the direction 
of international trade. But, “ancillary policies and fortuitous circumstances minimized the 
negative side-effects. The competitiveness of European producers, in conjunction with the 
high level of intra-European trade, minimized the damage from trade diversion and 
relative price distortions. US foreign investment guarantees and the relatively low volume 
of foreign portfolio investment that would have prevailed in the 1950s in any case for 
independent reasons meant that opting for convertibility would not have unleashed a 
surge of inward foreign investment. In this sense the EPU offered the best of both worlds." 
(Eichengreen 1993: 117). 
7.2 A monetary gimmick? 
A second criticism was that the EPU was a monetary "gimmick" and might, by rendering 
prevailing maladjustments easier to bear, prevent tackling the real problems. As Viner 
argued: “All these devices, though there are better and poorer ones, do not of themselves 
solve any problems. They may cover up the problem and create new problems. They will 
solve problems only if their manipulators are constantly bent on making these gimmicks 
unnecessary in the future. There is always the danger that these devices are sold to the 
world as true solutions and will thus free responsible leaders from the obligation to search 
for genuine, even though perhaps only partial, remedies. The bulk of the literature on 
these devices feeds this danger. It is a gimmick literature. It present gimmicks as genuine 
solutions and thus creates a diversion from really creative effort.” (as quoted in Knorr, 
1952: 29). Also Theodore Geiger, Head of Research of the US National Planning 
Association, criticized Triffin on this point: “I share Professor Viner’s fear that the monetary 
arrangement proposed by Bob Triffin, though no doubt likely to work better than existing 
arrangements, would work so well as to obscure many of the basic problems that must be 
attacked. It would obscure them not permanently, but it would obscure them long enough 
to permit fundamental disequilibrium to grow.” (as quoted in Knorr, 1952: 30) 11. 
                                                
11  This is also a classical dilemma for a central bank: monetary accommodation gives countries time to tackle 
the basic problems, but also diminishes the urgency to do so. 
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Triffin did not deny these dangers. He was in agreement that the fundamental problem 
was not a monetary one. However, he was concerned with what could be done before the 
fundamental problems could be tackled effectively. Rather than wait for the result of the 
long sweep, he was interested in ways of “solving some of our very concrete monetary 
problems of the moment”. In Triffin's view, the EPU was a concrete alternative to the 
failure of the IMF in dealing with the transferability problem of the European currencies. In 
Triffin's words: "Basic problems are rarely solved overnight, I reject, however, the defeatist 
conclusion that as long as those basic problems are not solved, there is no use in doing 
anything at all to adjust ourselves to existing disequilibria in the best possible manner. If 
you cannot have full convertibility now, full bilateralism is not necessarily the only 
alternative left, as EPU has shown. Call it gimmick, if you want. Say that it detracts 
attention from the basic problem, and that problem is not simply a monetary one. All that is 
true, but the fact that a better monetary arrangement is no panacea still does not mean 
that you can live without any monetary arrangement – or gimmick – whatsoever, or that an 
absurd monetary arrangement, which needlessly reinforces bilateralism and 
discrimination, is then preferable to a monetary arrangement which preserves the 
maximum of transferability and multilateralism compatible with the underlying trade and 
economic pattern" (as quoted in Knorr, 1952: 30-31). 
 
Moreover, Triffin stressed the importance of a pragmatic, step-by-step, approach, but 
based on a bold vision, "I have always insisted on this: the problem is to know in what 
general direction we want to move, and then to find out what the next steps are which are 
feasible now. We should not attempt to predict to the last detail … because the exact 
nature of these final arrangements will depend a great deal on the successes and failures 
we have met in approaching them. We must keep our plans sufficiently broad and flexible 
to adjust them continuously in the light of experience" (as quoted in Knorr, 1952c: 44-45). 
 
The EPU experience showed that multilateralism in trade and payments required 
cooperation among countries based on mutual commitments and binding rules. In Triffin's 
view this was not feasible on a world-wide basis, "It is possible only among countries 
which are highly interdependent … keenly conscious of their interdependence and able to 
understand each other’s problems and policies. These factors – different in degree, but 
not in kind, from these underlying a fuller political union – explain the success of, and 
justify the need for, regional cooperation in trade and payments" (Triffin, 1954: 212). 
These elements clearly point to the EPU as a separate geographical entity, as compared 
to countries or the world economy. However, the exact delimitation of the "region" 
remained rather vague (see also section 8.2).  
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Triffin further emphasised the relevance of an institutional framework. In particular he 
identified rules that make countries willing to cooperate and to observe the rules of the 
system and the balance of payments and policy constraints. Moreover, he advocated an 
EPU with a Managing Board and a unit of account. So, an institutional framework would 
contribute to distinguish the “region” as a separate geographical entity. 
 
8. The European Payments Union as the paradigm for Triffin’s approach towards 
a new European and international monetary system 
In August 1951, Triffin accepted a full-time Professorship at Yale, while remaining closely 
involved in policy work, for instance as an advisor to the OEEC, to European Commission 
Vice-President Robert Marjolin as well as to Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe. 
 
The European Payments Union would shape Triffin’s approach towards reform of the 
European and international monetary system. While he also developed proposals for a 
global reform of the IMS, he emphasised regional monetary integration, with Europe as 
one of the pillars of a multipolar IMS. 
8.1 Triffin's vision of the post-EPU IMS 
In the early 1950s, Triffin advanced three proposals for reform of the international 
monetary system. The first was a decentralization of the IMF machinery. The second 
concerned the IMF’s lending policy. Triffin proposed that IMF lending operations should 
shift "from individual salvage operations to triangular or multilateral operations designed to 
maintain a multilateral framework for monetary settlements" (Triffin 1952b: 473). As Triffin 
pointed out, this would involve the adoption of significant aspects of the Keynes Plan for a 
Clearing Union, with certain provisions for a symmetrical adjustment between debtors and 
creditors. The third proposal was the extension of the IMF’s jurisdiction to the handling of 
GATT problems since trade restrictions and exchange controls were largely 
interchangeable techniques for balance of payments adjustments (Triffin, 1952b: 475). 
 
During the 1950s, the world-wide dollar shortage gradually disappeared. At the end of the 
decade, Triffin became worried about the United States’ international reserve position: 
"The United States gold losses of 1958 are beginning to create some concern about the 
continued deterioration in the country's net reserve position... Such a movement obviously 
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could not continue indefinitely without ultimately undermining foreigners' confidence in the 
dollar as a safe medium for reserve accumulation" (Triffin, 1960, 63). 
 
Triffin, like Keynes, looked for a more "international" solution for the world liquidity 
problem. "The most promising line of approach to a long-term solution of the problem lies 
in the true 'internationalization' of the foreign exchange component of the world's 
international reserves, protecting the world monetary system from the instability resulting 
from arbitrary shifts from one reserve currency into another or into gold". (Triffin, 
1960, 71). Triffin himself also made an explicit link between his ideas and those of 
Keynes. In his opinion, the Keynes plan for a new international system was "to this day, 
far superior to any of the practical alternatives offered to it" (Triffin 1957: 107). 
 
Indeed, there are significant similarities between Triffin and Keynes. Both started out from 
the idea of a multilateral clearing system. Moreover, there should be an international 
currency and an international authority, with the objective of arriving at an international 
monetary system where balance of payments adjustments would be more symmetrical 
between deficit and surplus countries. 
 
Behind these shared ideas, there was a common vision or Weltanschauung, marked by 
the experience of the Great Depression, which questioned the self-equilibrating character 
of the free market economy. Both Keynes and Triffin rejected the gold standard and were 
in favour of a "managed currency". They both drew a parallel with the experience of 
national banking systems, which shored up credit in the economy, thus turning "stone into 
bread". 
 
However, there were also certain differences. Keynes’ proposal for a Clearing Union 
(Keynes 1943) was an official government document, and set out the British position in 
the negotiations for the new post-war international monetary system. It focused on the 
world-wide international monetary system and paid significant attention to the availability 
of credit for debtor countries (like the United Kingdom). Triffin, who was not so much 
presenting an official position, was more pragmatic, focusing on the transition period and, 
with the experience of the EPU, leaning in favour of a multipolar international monetary 
system. Triffin was also more sceptical of the use of the exchange rate as an economic 
adjustment instrument. Moreover, he emphasised the link between trade and international 
payments, which he considered as closely related. It would become part of a continental 
European tradition of emphasizing the link between a common market and exchange rate 
stability. A further difference is that Triffin was sympathetic to the quantity theory of money, 
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of which Keynes was a great critic.12 But this did not really lead to any differences in their 
analyses of international imbalances. 
8.2 Triffin’s vision of a "post-EPU" Europe 
Triffin was a also convinced European federalist. He got to know Jean Monnet in 1948 
and became very active in Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe. At 
a conference on the problems of European integration held in Genoa in 1953, Triffin 
focused on the monetary dimension. He started with an examination of the conditions for 
European monetary integration, arguing that monetary integration did not require adoption 
of a single common currency. Yet, it did require national European currencies to be freely 
convertible at fixed and invariable exchange rates: "A single currency is the symbol, much 
more than the substance, of monetary integration. However spectacular it may be, 
economically speaking, it has only very secondary differences from coexistence of freely 
convertible national currencies at fixed and invariable rates" (Triffin, 1953: 207). It would 
remain a constant in Triffin's vision. He would not focus on the institutional architecture of 
economic and monetary union (Maes and Bussière, 2016).  
 
Triffin insisted that convertibility among currencies demanded, as a pre-condition, balance 
of payments equilibrium and then went further into the conditions for reaching equilibrium. 
He stressed that this depended on the adjustment of wages and living standards to the 
varying degrees of productivity existing in each country. Anticipating certain arguments of 
the optimum currency area theory13, Triffin argued that factors of production mobility, 
especially labour, might ease balance of payments adjustment by reducing productivity 
gaps between the countries in the group. He also emphasized that in an integrated 
monetary area different - rather than uniform - fiscal, economic and social policies could 
be preferable in order to deal with national divergences in economic and social structure 
(Triffin, 1953: 208). Triffin considered three examples for balance of payments adjustment 
which might guide European countries' policies in an integrated monetary area. The first 
involved the acceptance of automatic adaptation to price differentials and priority to the 
attainment of external balance against desirable domestic policy objectives. The second 
required the creation of common budgetary and fiscal policies, entailing a certain 
distribution of income between the regions. The third involved accommodating capital 
flows. However, Triffin thought that, in the 1950s, European monetary integration could not 
                                                
12 Triffin even made an important contribution to the monetary approach to the balance of payments of the 
IMF. The analytical basis of the approach was elaborated by Triffin during his period at the Federal 
Reserve Board and was refined when he moved to the International Monetary Fund in September 1946 
(see Rhomberg and Heller,1977, and Polak 2001). 
13 The optimum currency area theory, which dominated the theoretical debates on monetary integration in the 
1960s, focused on the criteria that would delimite the optimal domain of a currency area (see Maes, 2002: 
14-19). 
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be attained along these lines (Triffin, 1953: 208). European countries would not accept 
internal adjustments if these might threaten employment and economic activity. Also, the 
degree of countries' solidarity was not sufficient for the creation of a supranational 
institution to which they would transfer political powers. 
 
Triffin argued that the most practical way ahead for monetary integration was the 
development of the EPU (Triffin, 1953: 210). Offering some guidelines for this, he first of 
all suggested setting up a joint reserve fund, constituted by deposits from the member 
countries. By providing financing in the event of balance of payments difficulties, it would 
avoid countries resorting to policies such as exchange rate adjustments or exchange 
restrictions. Moreover, it would strengthen the Managing Board's influence on members’ 
policies. Secondly, he advised wider use of the EPU unit of account in all intra-European 
loans and investments. This would thus "restore capital markets in Europe and might 
provide governments with a far more attractive source of financing than the printing press" 
(Triffin 1951: 461). Triffin further emphasised that the EPU unit of account would also 
support the emergence of a single European currency. When countries managed to 
stabilize their currencies, they could declare new national currencies against and equal to 
the EPU unit of account. As a consequence, "while the new currencies would remain 
purely national in law, exchange fluctuations would be greatly discouraged by the mere 
similarity of their valuations" (Triffin 1951: 460). The replacement of the domestic 
currencies with a single currency would finally require the setting up of a European 
Monetary Authority, entrusted with sole issue rights for all participating countries.  
 
Later, Triffin was also critical of the Treaty of Rome, as it left macroeconomic and 
monetary policy-making mainly in the hands of the individual EEC Member States. Triffin 
(1958: 1) described the limited monetary dimension of the EEC Treaty as "a Hamlet in 
which the role of the Prince of Denmark is almost totally ignored". Triffin himself took a 
voluntarist approach towards European monetary integration with proposals for a 
European Reserve Fund and a European currency. 
 
Asked for advice by Monnet and Marjolin (then Vice-President of the European 
Commission), Triffin elaborated ideas for a European Reserve Fund in the second half of 
the 1950s. This request was related to the French financial crisis at that time, which 
threatened France’s participation in the Common Market project, a matter of serious 
concern for Monnet and Marjolin (Maes and Buyst 2004). The Fund could be constituted 
by pooling 10 to 20 % of the international reserves of the EEC Member States' central 
banks. The Fund could provide for different types of loans, both to assist countries with 
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balance of payments difficulties and also to support economic growth (Ferrant and 
Sloover 2010). 
 
The idea returned to the agenda in 1969, when Willy Brandt became German Chancellor. 
Brandt was a member of Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe, which he consulted in order to prepare for the Hague Summit. Monnet appealed 
to Robert Triffin, who drew up a new proposal for a European Reserve Fund (Monnet 
1976: 610). 
 
Triffin was also a strong advocate of the introduction of a European currency unit as a 
parallel currency (Maes and Bussière, 2016). As mentioned, already in the 1950s, Triffin 
had argued for the use of the EPU unit of account as a parallel currency, something he felt 
would pave the way for a monetary union. It is remarkable that Triffin was not only active 
in the public sector but also in the private sector. So was he an Administrator of 
Kredietbank Luxembourgeoise, which, in 1961, under his inspiration, was the first bank to 
issue a bond denominated in the European unit of account.  
 
Throughout the 1960s, Triffin advanced similar plans for other geographical areas such as 
Latin America, Asia and Africa. He submitted his proposal to the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in mid 1950s, when first initiatives were launched to 
reorganize and simplify the system of bilateral arrangements then existing in the area14. 
Various proposals where put forward by Triffin at the United Nations Economic 
Commissions for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) and the United Nations Commission for 
Africa (ECA). With reference to the latter regional areas, characterized mostly by 
underdeveloped countries, Triffin affirmed that monetary integration could provide a way to 
organize efficiently international financial assistance for economic development 
purposes15. 
 
                                                
14 In response to ECLA suggestions, the various aspects of the problem and alternative lines of approach 
were discussed in successive meetings of Technicians of Central Banks of the American Continent, and of 
the Center of Latin American Monetary Studies (Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, 
CEMLA). The first step on the matter was the establishment of a Central American Clearing House 
between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, - Nicaragua, Costa Rica - in the summer 1961. Later, in 
September 1962 the problem for a clearing mechanism between the Latin American countries’ central 
banks on broader basis was further explored in the meeting of the CEMLA in Mexico City where Triffin 
proposed a paper (“A Latin American Clearing House and Payments Union”) which was widely criticized by 
the IMF technical staff in a report distributed at the CEMLA in June 1963 and then published in the IMF 
Staff Papers in November 1963 (Keesing, Brand, 1963). The adverse attitude of the IMF towards Triffin’s 
proposal was then revised in later months when its representatives at the CEMLA expressed their full 
support for the unanimous resolution adopted at the 7th Meeting of the Central Bank Technicians of the 
American Continent at Rio de Janeiro in October 1963 in favour of a more active exploration of the 
problem at a negotiating level. The latter decision led to the agreement for the establishment of the Central 
American Monetary Union on February 5th 1964.  
15 A selection of memoranda prepared by Triffin has been republished in Triffin, 1966a: 478-543. 
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As already observed, Triffin made no significant distinction between a monetary union and 
a system of stable exchange rates: "The participating regions or countries must, in either 
case, subordinate their internal monetary and credit expansion to the maintenance of 
equilibrium in their balance of payments. From an economic viewpoint, monetary 
unification would even impose a somewhat less stringent monetary discipline on the 
participating countries, since the elimination of exchange risks would be even more 
complete than under a system of free and stable exchange rates, and would therefore 
stimulate the cushioning of temporary deficits through readjusting capital movements 
rather than aggravate them through speculative capital flight." (Triffin 1957: 289). 
However, Europe’s monetary union showed that, with accommodating capital movements, 
disequilibria were not corrected, leading to significant imbalances and bubbles. They 
eventually burst and contributed to the crisis of the early 2010s. With hindsight, this was a 
weakness of Triffin’s analyses. The euro area’s sovereign debt crisis demonstrated that 
monetary union created very strong and complex interdependencies, requiring a strong 
economic policy framework and close coordination of policies, posing also the question of 
political union. 
9. Conclusion 
Robert Triffin was not only an architect of the European Payments Union, but his 
experience with the EPU would be at the origin of his vision that, in order to reform the 
international monetary system, a regional approach was the most appropriate one.  
 
As is well known, there is a significant continuity in Triffin’s work. From his first article in 
1935, he developed a vision that the international adjustment process was not functioning 
according to the classical mechanisms (Maes, 2013). Very fundamentally, Triffin was part 
of a generation of Keynesian economists which did not believe in the self-equilibrating 
character of the free market economy. For Triffin, with his focus on the international 
economy, the key policy conclusion, already clearly articulated in 1947, was to put 
international liquidity at the heart of the international monetary system and ensure close 
economic policy coordination as well, with an important role for the IMF.  
 
However, as argued in this article, the EPU marked a significant shift in Triffin’s thinking. 
With his work on the EPU, Triffin introduced a new geographical entity in the international 
economy, besides national economies and the world economy: the region (even if he 
remained rather vague in its definition). In his analysis of postwar Europe, Triffin 
emphasized that several structural factors, especially the low level of gold and dollar 
reserves and weak industrial capacity, impeded the successful operation of market forces. 
Moreover, he feared political instability and social unrest in the event of an abrupt 
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restoration of convertibility. So he argued for a pragmatic, regional, approach, with the 
European Payments Union, which gave priority to the abolition of bilateral trade and 
payments restrictions in favour of multilateral clearing in Europe. It became a big success. 
His vision emerges also in the relevance he gave to the institutional framework, with a key 
role for the EPU Board and the EPU unit of account. 
 
With his emphasis on regional integration, Triffin went strongly against the IMF view, 
where he worked from September 1946 to November 1949, and which was in favour of a 
world-wide approach to the restoration of convertibility. One clearly sees how Triffin, at the 
end of the 1940s and the early 1950s, became more and more disappointed with and 
critical of the IMF as he strongly favoured a regional approach towards the restoration of 
convertibility. 
 
The EPU would shape Triffin’s later policy proposals. He became an ardent advocate of 
regional monetary integration, especially, but not only, in Europe. His ideas of a European 
Reserve Fund and the importance of a European currency unit, taken over from his 
experience of the EPU, were essential parts of his proposals for European monetary 
integration. Very fundamentally, in Triffin's pragmatic approach, regional monetary 
integration was a step towards a new multipolar international monetary system.  
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